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The Impact of the Deposit Requirement
for Patenting Biotechnology: Present

Concerns, Proposed Solutions
ABSTRACT

Patenting the fruits of biotechnological research often involves
problems unique to that scientificfield, especially when the resulting inventions employ micro-organisms that cannot be described easily because
of their novelty to the field. The importance of satisfactorily resolving
these problems increases because most developed states now allow biotech
inventors to patent the novel organism itself In response to the concern
that words are often inadequate to identify completely these microbes,
states began allowing biotech patent applicants to deposit a sample culture of the novel micro-organism as a supplement to the written description. This Note addresses the shortcomings of the deposit requirement
due, in part, to its nonuniform development among developed states. The
Note begins by following the development of the requirement in the
United States, certain European states, and the European Patent Convention. The Note also addresses the genesis of patenting the micro-organisms themselves and the various attempts at solving the attendant
problems of deposit. The Note concludes by evaluating the current situation and proposing some potential solutions.
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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the more noteworthy industrial developments in recent
history' is the biotechnology revolution.2 The "potential fruits" of biotechnological research contribute to the.growing importance of the science of biotechnology, both economically and socially. 3 To stimulate research and accelerate progress in this field, states have relied heavily
upon the patent system to offer protection for products resulting from

1. See Biotech Comes of Age, Bus. WK., Jan 23, 1984, at 84 (describing biotechnology as a technical revolution that may come to rival even the development of the com-

puter); L.

ORSENIGO, THE EMERGENCE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: INSTITUTIONS AND
MARKETS IN INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 63-69, 126 (1989) (discussing the growth in

biotechnological activities worldwide).

2. "Biotechnology, the use of living organisms in a manufacturing or productive role,
is actually a new term for an old industry. People have always sought to use the abilities
and characteristics of other organisms to improve society. For example, through the development of breeding techniques and the cultivation of various hybrid animals and
plants, existing species have been improved and new species developed." John E. Schneider, Note, Microorganismsand the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not To Deposit, That is
the Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 592, 592 n.1 (1984).
3. Biotechnological Inventions: A Position Paper of the InternationalChamber of
Commerce, 18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 223 (1987) [hereinafter Position Paper]. "The Position Paper . . . elaborated by the IIC [International Review of
Industrial Property and Copyright Law] Working Party on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions ... with slight amendments ...

was adopted as a statement of

the International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] at the 47th session of the Executive
Board of the ICC on December 2, 1986." Id. at 223 n.1.
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biotech research. 4 Initially, these new biotech products incorporated only
those micro-organisms that were known and readily available to researchers in the field. Additionally, because of their common use within
the biotech field, these micro-organisms could be described specifically. 5
With the development of antibiotics, however, caime the need to employ
strains of micro-organisms that had been modified artificially to produce
a desired result.' The modified micro-organisms, or microbes as they
often are denoted, were increasingly difficult to describe in words because they were not previously known or available. To cope with the
problem caused by the inability to provide a sufficient written disclosure
of their invention, inventors began to supplement their patent applications by depositing samples of the novel microbes with a culture depositary.' As states began to recognize that the new strain itself might be
patentable, the importance of the so-called deposit requirement increased
dramatically.'
Unfortunately, the deposit requirement, combined with conditions existing prior to and developments occurring since its implementation in
the United States and several European states, frequently exact a high
price from biotechnological inventors. All too often, inventors may be
required to forfeit valuable property rights in inventions, which, absent
the deposit requirement, they could not have been forced to surrender.9
This Note addresses the parallel development of the deposit requirement in the United States, certain European States, and the European
Patent Convention. l" The Note also addresses the allowance of patent
claims relating to micro-organisms themselves." The Note then discusses
various attempts to solve some of the problems raised by the issue of
deposit'" and concludes by assessing and evaluating the present state of
practice.'

4. Id. at 223.
5. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
6. See Donald Levy & Lucile B. Wendt, Microbiology and a Standard Formatfor
Infra-Red Absorption Spectra in Antibiotic Patent Applications, 37 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y

855 (1955).
7. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Levy & Wendt, supra note 6, at 856-87; Ex Parte Kropp, 143
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 148, 152-53 (Pat. Bd. App. 1959) (failure to deposit micro-organism or
to disclose its source rendered specification insufficient).
9. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra part III.
12. See infra parts IV, V(B)(3).
13. See infra part VIII.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT

Inventions incorporating micro-organisms 4 have been recognized as
patentable subject matter for over a century.15 For several decades, the
microbes used in these inventions were known and readily available to
researchers in the biotech field."6 As a result of rapid advances in antibiotic development during the 1940s and 1950s," researchers began using
artificially modified strains of micro-organisms designed to improve and
increase the yields of antibiotics. 8 Many of the organisms used in the
production of antibiotics were neither familiar to other biotech researchers, nor isolatable from known and publicly available sources without
undue experimentation. 9 It was increasingly difficult for patent applicants in the biotech field to meet the enabling disclosure and best mode
requirements of a particular state's patent laws.20 To facilitate compliance with these provisions, applicants began supplementing patent applications by depositing samples with a recognized culture depositary of the

14. Microbiological inventions can come within any of four statutory classes of inventions, see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Examples include:
1. Machines-a laboratory pipetting machine, a zone reader ...
2. Manufacture-abiologically pure culture of a novel microbe, a 8loned gene;
3. Composition of matter-a chemical compound made by a microbiological
process, a biologically pure culture of a novel microbe, a cloned gene;
4. Process-a microbiological process for preparing a chemical compound, a
process for purifying nucleotide sequences.
ROMAN SALIWANCHIK, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MICROBIOLOGICAL AND GENETIC
ENGINEERING INVENTIONS 4 (1982).

15. Louis Pastuer patented a biologically pure yeast culture as a new article of manufacture in 1873. U.S. Pat. No. 141,072 (1873). Schneider, supra note 2, at 595 n.28
(citing U.S. Pat. No. 141,072 (1873)). See also Donald G. Daus, Patentsfor Biotechnology, 26 IDEA 263 (1986).
16. See Schneider, supra note 2, at 595.
17. See generally Levy & Wendt, supra note 6.
18. See Daus, supra note 15, at 264.
19. See generally SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 68.
20. See, e.g., JOSEPH STRAUS & RAINER MOUFANG, DEPOSIT AND RELEASE OF
BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF PATENT PROCEDURE: INDUSTRIAL AND
TANGIBLE PROPERTY ISSUES 13 (1990). For example, British patent law requires that
the application "disclose the invention in a manner . . . clear enough and complete

enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art." Patent Act 1977
§ 14(3) (1977) (Eng.), reprinted in 33 HALSBURY'S STATUTES, at 143 (4th ed. 1987).
Similarly, in the United States the requirement is that the specification be concise enough
"to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make and use the
same." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). German patent law requires that the disclosure meet a

"reproducibility" standard. See Baker's Yeast Decision, 1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975),
reprinted in 6 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 207, 212 (1975).
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relevant micro-organism.2 1 Hoping that the courts and patent offices of
the various states would approve, inventors worldwide adopted the deposit practices.22
A.

The United States

In the 1970 In re Argoudelis decision,2 3 the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) approved the deposit requirement.2 4 The court confirmed that requiring a sample to be deposited was
necessary to guarantee full compliance with the enabling disclosure requirement.25 Unlike the German courts, the CCPA found unnecessary
the requirement that the general public be granted access to the deposited culture prior to the patent grant.28 Instead, the CCPA stated explicitly that the purpose of section 112 is not to compel an applicant whose
invention involves the use of a novel micro-organism to "surrender his
starting materials to the general public before filing, whereas an applicant in the other arts need tell the public nothing until his patent
27
issues."1
The Argoudelis court did not address the required timing of the deposit in relation to the application's filing. The Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) has since assumed that the sample could be deposited no
later than the time the application was filed. 2 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) 2' determined otherwise in In
re Lundak. ° The CAFC decided that an applicant need not make a
deposit until the time the patent has issued, provided the PTO's right to
31
demand a sample during the examination procedure remained secure.
As a direct result of Lundak, an applicant is not divested automati21.

See Daus, supra note 15, at 264.

22. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 13.
23. 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
24. Id. at 1392-93.
25. Id. at 1392. For the enabling requirement, see 35 U.S.C. § 112.
26. Id. at 1392-93.
27. Id. at 1393.
28. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 46.
29. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), an Article
III court, was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25, which merged the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) and the Court of Claims. Congress' primary objective in creating the CAFC
was "to eliminate a persistent disparity in patent law standards among courts of appeals
deciding patent cases." PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RE-

198-99 (3d ed. 1990).
30. 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
31. Id. at 1222-24. See also STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 46.
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cally of property rights in the micro-organism simply upon the filing of a
patent application.32 Moreover, the applicant can establish during the
course of the examination procedure that a deposit is unnecessary because the specification provides a sufficient written description. 3 The
United States patent law gives an applicant for a microbiological-type
patent greater control over the disposition of the deposited sample prior
to the patent grant or refusal. The applicant, however, may not restrict
further the public's access to the sample after a patent is granted.34
B.

The Federal Republic of Germany

35
Indeed, the deposit practice did begin to gain widespread acceptance.
In 1967, the German Federal Patent Court (BPatG) became the first
court to confirm the practice when it held that to constitute an enabling
disclosure, a sample culture must be deposited no later than the date on
which the applicant files an application." The BPatG also held that the
name of the depositary institution where the organism is deposited must
37
be designated in the application before the deposit is considered valid.
Eight years later, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) confirmed these
rulings, in the Baker's Yeast decision. 38 The BGH added the requirement that the deposited culture must be available to any third party from
the time the application is published, thereby insuring that the invention
is capable of being reproduced.3

C. Great Britain and the European Patent Convention
Under the British Pitents Act of 1977, a patent applicant must provide, within the application, a description of the invention sufficient to
40
enable a person skilled in the particular art to practice the invention.
When a microbiological invention employs an unfamiliar micro-organism, a sample culture of the microbe must be deposited on or before the

32.
33.

See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 46-48.

Id. at 47.

34. Id. at 49-50.
35. See generally id. at 13-15.
36. Id. at 13 (citing BPatGE 9, 150).
37.

Id.

1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975), reprinted in 6 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
L. 207 (1975). See also STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 53-56.
39. 1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975), reprinted in 6 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L., at 214-15. See also STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 53-54.
40. Patents Act 1977 § 14(3) (1977) (Eng.), reprinted in 33 HALSBURY'S STATUTES, at 143 (4th ed. 1987).
38.

COPYRIGHT
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date upon which the British application is filed. 4 The application must
include the depositary's name, the sample culture's identification number, 42 and the deposit date.4 This information, however, may be submitted up to two months after the original filing date."" In pertinent respects, the British system resembles the German and the United States
systems.4 5
The European Patent Convention (the EPC), signed at Munich in
1973 and entered into force in 1977,46 has become an increasingly important and influential single-application patent system. Under the EPC,
if an invention requires the use of a micro-organism that neither is readily available to the public, nor is capable of being sufficiently described
in the application, the inventor must deposit a culture of the micro-organism no later than the filing date and must describe in the application
any relevant characteristics of the organism. The inventor has up to sixteen months after the filing date to submit information regarding the
micro-organism's location. 47 An applicant's compliance with these re-

41. SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 152.
42. The accession number is the identification number assigned to the culture by the
repository upon deposit. Each accession number refers to only one culture deposit and

only one deposit date. Id.
43. Id.
44. This British requirement of the deposit date differs from United States practice,
which requires that the repository name and the accession number be contained in the
application when filed, but does not require the disclosure of the deposit date. Id.
45. See generally id. at 151-52. All three systems require a sample culture to be
deposited when a written description of the micro-organism does not fulfill disclosure
requirements. Furthermore, the applicant must supply identifying information with respect to the deposited sample at some point in the application process. See supra notes
24-25, 28-30, 35-36, 41-43 and accompanying text.
46. See generally id. at 142. At the time of filing, the applicant must designate the
states in which patents are desired. The number of states designated by the applicant
may be reduced, but not increased, during the patent process. Convention on the Grant
of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 79 [hereinafter European Patent Convention],
reprinted in M. VAN EMPEL, THE GRANTING OF EUROPEAN PATENTS 339, 355
(1975). See also id. art. 79(3) and Rule 14, reprinted in VAN EMPEL at 355, 383
(prohibiting reduction of designated countries if a third party asserts a right to ownership
of the invention).
47. European Patent Convention Rules 28 (1) and (2) state:
1. If an invention concerns a microbiological process or the product thereof and
involves the use of a micro-organism which is not available to the public, the European patent application and the resulting European patent shall only be regarded as disclosing the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it
to be carried out by a person skilled in the art if:
a. a culture of the micro-organism has been deposited in a culture collection not
later than the date of filing of the application;
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quirements constitutes "the unreserved and irrevocable consent of the applicant to the culture deposited being made available to the public in
accordance with [the EPC Rules]." 48
The EPC has harmonized the majority of the member states' national
patent laws. Nevertheless, because member states are not required to incorporate the EPC recommendations into their own laws, each state's
patent laws will reflect particular national preferences. 4
The German, British, and EPC deposit procedures share a common
requirement that deposit be made upon application for patent. In Europe, generally, from the time of deposit forward, the depositor has no
right to restrict public access to a sample of the deposited culture. 50 In
contrast, the United States allows deposit to be withheld until the patent
grant. This United States practice insures that if a patent does not issue,
the inventor will have lost no property rights in the invention. Upon
issuance of a valid United States patent, however, the inventor can impose no restrictions on public access to the deposit. 5 '
III.

PATENTABILITY OF MICRO-ORGANISMS

A. Background
A recent development impacting the deposit mechanism's importance
is the recognition that novel micro-organisms themselves may be patentable subject matter under the patent law.52 Prior to the 1980s, the basic
legal principles constituting the foundation of United States biotechnological intellectual property law developed primarily to accommodate the

b. the application as filed gives such relevant information as is available to the
applicant on the characteristics of the micro-organism;
c. the culture collection, the date when the culture was deposited and the file
number of the deposit are given in the application.
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1(c) may be submitted within a
period of two months after the filing of the application. The communication of this
information shall be considered as constituting the unreserved and irrevocable consent of the applicant to the culture deposited being made available to the public in
accordance with this Rule.
European Patent Convention, supra note 46, Rule 28(1)-(2), reprinted in VAN EMPEL
at 386-87.
48. European Patent Convention, supra note 46, Rule 28(2), reprinted in VAN EMPEL at 387.
49. See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 14.
50. See supra notes 23-27, 39-45 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
52. See generally I.L. Fuller, Intellectual Property Rights Associated with Biotechnology-An InternationalTrade Perspective, 16 AIPLA Q. J. 529, 533-34 (1988-89).
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pharmaceutical industry. 53 Decades of patenting processes and compositions involving micro-organisms necessarily begged the question of
whether the micro-organism itself could be the subject of a patent claim
under existing patent law theory and practice. 4 Considerable opposition
to the idea of patenting life led to fierce debate on this topic. 55 Those
opposed to the patenting of the micro-organism bolstered their position
by reference to the well-accepted doctrine that laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and undeveloped ideas are not patentable." This argument,
however, failed to satisfy biotechnological inventors, who, while developing a patentable process, often developed a completely novel microorganism.
B.

Chakrabarty in the United States and Baker's Yeast in Germany

The United States Supreme Court addressed the micro-organism patentability issue in the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.57
Chakrabarty had developed a genetically modified oil-eating bacterium
that he wanted to patent.58 The PTO allowed the claims relating to the
method of bacteria production and the inoculum comprised of the carrier
material and bacteria,59 but rejected the claim relating to the bacterium
itself.8 0 The CCPA reversed on the authority of an earlier case, which
held that "the fact that micro-organisms . . . are alive . . .[is] without
legal significance" in patent law," and that a patent should not be denied merely because micro-organisms are living things.8 2

53.

Geoffrey M. Karny, Intellectual Property in the 1990s: Patenting Higher Life

Forms, in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW FOR THE
1990s: ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE 1 (BNA 1989). See generally Levy & Wendt,

supra note 6.

54. See Karny, supra note 53, at 1.
55. See generally id.
56. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (method of updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion through use of mathematical formual not patentable); Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (method for converting binary coded decimal information
to pure binary numbers for use in programming computers not a patentable process);

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (discovery that certain
strains of bacteria can be mixed safely not patentable because it is discovery of a natural
phenomenon).

57. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

58. Id. at 305 & n.2, 306.
59. These two claims were found to be proper subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as a process and a composition of matter, respectively. Id. at 306.

60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (1977)).
62. Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1038.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA decision and
rejected the notion that Congress intended to distinguish between patentable and nonpatentable subject matter on the basis of living and nonliving matter. 63 Instead, the Court stated that the proper distinction is between "products of nature, whether living or not, [which are not
'64
patentable], and human-made inventions, [which are patentable].
The German Supreme Court also has conceded to micro-organism
patentability.60 The International Chamber of Commerce, approving this
view, advocated that all developed states extend patent protection to, or
at least not automatically withhold protection from, micro-organisms.6 "
This position corresponds to that of the United States, the EPC, and
Japan. 67 By recognizing micro-organisms as patentable subject matter,
national patent laws have expanded the scope of protection available to
biotechnological inventors, simultaneously have sparked commercial in-

terest in biotechnology,
remain to be

63.

8

and have raised new issues and concerns that

addressed.6"

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.

64. Id. The Court held that the bacterium was patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because it had "markedly different characteristics from any found in nature
and one having the potential for significant utility. [The] discovery is not nature's handiwork, but [Chakabarty's] own." Id. at 310.
In so holding, the Court determined that Chakrabarty's micro-organism was either a
manufacture or a composition of matter. Id. at 309-10.
65.

Baker's Yeast Decision, 1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975), reprinted in 6 INT'L

REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 207 (1975).

66.

Position Paper, supra note 3, at 225-26.

67. Id. at 226.
68. Between 1980 and 1982, approximately 200 companies were formed to exploit
biotechnology. Colin Norman, Another Biotechnology Company Bites the Dust, 217 SciENCE 1016 (1982). See also Barbara J. Culliton, Monsanto Gives Washington U. $23.5
Million , 216 SCIENCE 1295 (1982). For articles on increased foreign interest, see David
Dickson, German Firms Move Into Biotechnology, 218 SCIENCE 1287 (1982); David
Dickson, France Boosts Biotechnology, 217 SCIENcE 516 (1982); Harold M. Schmeck

Jr., Report Says Japan Could Lead in Commercial Biotechnology, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 27,
1984, at A9.
69. Examples include questions concerning circumstances under which deposit is
necessary, timing of deposit and release, identity of parties to whom a sample can be
released, and conditions of release. See generally infra notes 24, 30, 40 and accompanying

text; see supra notes 135, 139, 145 and accompanying text.
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THE BUDAPEST TREATY: AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO
HARMONIZE DEPOSIT

As the number of states that required patent applications for biotechnological inventions to be supplemented by deposit increased, so did
the burden on applicants hoping to patent inventions in more than one of
these states because a separate deposit would be required for each state's
application. 0 To relieve this burden and to encourage continued research and development in biotechnology, cooperation was necessary.
Cooperation took the form of the Budapest Treaty on the International
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent
Procedure (Budapest Treaty or the Treaty),7 which concluded in 1977
and entered into force in 1980.72 As of 1990, twenty-four states had
signed the Budapest Treaty." Article 7 of the Treaty provides for the
establishment of international depositary authorities in which micro-organisms may be deposited.7 4 Article 3 obligates the contracting states to
recognize the deposit of a micro-organism in any depositary institution
authorized by the Treaty. 5
The Budapest Treaty heavily regulates procedures, and certain

70. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 15.
71. The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241 [hereinafter Budapest Treaty], reprinted in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF THE BUDAPEST DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION
OF A TREATY ON THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE DEPOSIT OF MICROORGANISMS FOR THE PURPOSES OF PATENT PROCEDURE 11

72.

STRAUS & MOUFANG,

(1980) [hereinafter RECORDS].

supra note 20, at 15.

73. Id. at 15 n.9. These states are referred to as "Contracting States.'
74. Budapest Treaty, supra note 71, art. 7, 32 U.S.T. at 1246, reprinted in
RECORDS at 23.

75.

Budapest Treaty, supra note 71, art. 3, 32 U.S.T. at 1244, reprinted in

RECORDS at 17. Article 3 reads, in relevant part:

Recognition and Effect of the Deposit of Microorganisms
(1)(a) Contracting States which allow or require the deposit of microorganisms for
the purposes of patent procedure shall recognize, for such purposes, the deposit of

a microorganism with any international depositary authority. Such recognition
shall include the recognition of the fact and date of the deposit as indicated by the
international depositary authority as well as the recognition of the fact that what is
furnished as a sample is a sample of the deposited microorganism.
(2) As far as matters regulated in this Treaty and the Regulations are concerned,
no Contracting State may require compliance with requirements different from or
additional to those which are provided in this Treaty and the Regulations.
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mechanical aspects of depositing and releasing samples7 6 within the depositary institutions. The Treaty, however, has minimal influence on the
substantive law of each contracting state. This arrangement is not the
one originally intended by the initial participating states. Special interest
groups concerned with this issue had hoped for an arrangement that
would have bound contracting states with respect to their national law
on the issue of releasing samples to third parties." The participating
states first had aimed for an arrangement under which no contracting
state would have been required to amend the substance of its own patent
law,"8 except "that publication constituted the minimum limit in time for
the release to third parties (non-release of samples to third parties before
publication)." 9 Unfortunately, even this small goal proved unattainable.
Some of the participating states' patent laws permit third parties to inspect the files of the patent office prior to an application's publication.8"
The arrangement adopted in the final version of the Treaty enables a
third party to obtain a sample of the deposited material prior to publication if, under the patent law of the state concerned, the party is entitled
to access to the application.8 1
Hence, according to the Treaty, whether a third party may obtain a
sample of the micro-organism is determined solely by the substantive law
of the contracting state. Nonetheless, the state's patent office must attest
in writing, on a form, the contents of which are fixed by the Assembly of
the Budapest Union, that the certified party has the right to demand a
sample and that any conditions, prerequisite to the granting of access to
the sample, have been fulfilled.8 2 Clearly, the Budapest Treaty does very
little to harmonize the contracting states' patent laws. The Treaty, however, is useful for applicants who wish to apply for patents in several
states because it permits the deposit of only a single sample.

76.

Budapest Treaty, supra note 71, Rule 11.3, 32 U.S.T. at 1258-59, reprinted in

RECORDS

at 75, 77.

77.

STRAUS & MOUFANG,

78.

Id.

supra note 20, at 43.

79. Comment by J.L. Comte, the Chairman of the Main Committee of the Budapest
Diplomatic Conference, reprinted in RECORDS, supra note 71, para. 1236.2, at 360.

80. STRAUS &

MOUFANG,

supra note 20, at 43.

81. Budapest Treaty, supra note 71, Rule 11.3(a)(iii), 32 U.S.T. at 1258-59, reprinted in RECORDS at 75, 77.
82. Id. See also STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 43-44.
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V.

PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT

Although the deposit requirement eliminates the difficulty involved in
providing an adequate written description of a novel micro-organism, it
creates new difficulties in other aspects of the microbiological patent process. One major cause for concern among inventors and potential patent
applicants arises from the dual nature of the micro-organism, which incorporates both tangible and intangible property.83 Another problem
arises in states that have amended their national patent law to provide
for early publication of patent applications, often prior to examination
84
by the patent office.
A.

The Dual Nature of Micro-organisms

An inventor who creates a new micro-organism simultaneously generates valuable intangible property-the idea embodied in the invention. 5
The micro-organism itself, however, constitutes tangible personal property.8" Historically, the primary objective of patent law has been to promote advances in science and technology by granting inventors exclusive
rights in their inventions in the form of patents.8 7 Patent law protects the
inventor's intangible property rights by granting the inventor a monopoly of limited scope and duration to make, use, or sell the invention.88 In
exchange for these exclusive rights, the inventor is required to disclose
fully the nature of the invention. Upon expiration of the patent, this
disclosure enables the public to utilize freely the resourcefulness of the
invention. This limited monopoly of an enforceable patent has been
viewed either as consideration for the inventor's relinquishing the right
to keep the know-how secret or as a reward for making the invention
available to the public.8 9
The deposit requirement does not alter the scope of patent protection
with respect to the invention claimed, because the deposited sample
merely functions as a supplement to, or substitute for, the compulsory
written description." Nonetheless, the deposit requirement constitutes an

83. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
85. John W. Schlicher, Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Licensing

Biotechnology Patent and Related Property Rights in the United States, 69 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 263, 275 (1987).
86.

See GOLDSTEIN,

supra note

34, at 358-59.

87. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).

88. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
89. See generally STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 23-29.
90. See, e.g., In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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unduly intrusive infringement of the inventor's tangible property rights
in the micro-organism. 1 The original justification for this deposit practice arose from situations in which a written description was insufficient
to satisfy the enabling disclosure or reproducibility requirement. 92 A
sample of the organism could supply the descriptive elements that words
simply could not capture. 3 The additional burden placed on the inventor
by requiring a sample to be deposited is arguably minimal when viewed
in light of the simplified disclosure. The inventor's lost property rights
could be justified as an additional cost imposed on the inventor in exchange for patent protection. Furthermore, because the Budapest Treaty
allows the inventor to make only a single deposit, which will be recognized in all contracting states, 94 the inventor arguably has little cause for
complaint. But this lack of grounds for complaint would be true only if a
sample deposit were all that is required of inventors of biotechnology.
The additional expense, however, is not the only infringement of
rights imposed by the deposit requirement. Because the deposited sample
may be released to third parties under conditions established by the patent law of the particular state in which the patent is sought,9" the Buda-

STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 96-100.
92. See, e.g., In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
93. "Ordinarily no problem in this regard arises since the method of preparing al-

91.

most all starting materials can be set forth in writing ... and when this is done the
specification is enabling to the public .... [But] because of the particular area of tech-

nology involved, [one] cannot sufficiently disclose by written word how to obtain the
microorganism starting material from nature." Id. at 1392.
94. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
95. Rule 11.3 of the Budapest Treaty provides:
(a) Any international depositary authority shall furnish a sample of any deposited
microorganism to any authority, natural person or legal entity (hereinafter referred to as "the certified party"), on the request of such party, provided that the
request is made on a form whose contents are fixed by the Assembly and that on
the said form the industrial property office certifies:
(ii) that, except where the second phrase of (iii) applies, [the application has
been published];
(iii) either that the certified party has a right to a sample ... under the law
governing patent procedure before that office and, where the said law makes the
said right dependent on the fulfillment of certain conditions, that [those conditions
have actually been fulfilled or are deemed to have been fulfilled]; where the certified party has the said right under the said law prior to publication for the purposes of patent procedure by the said office and such publication has not yet been
effected, the certification shall expressly state so.
Budapest Treaty, supra note 71, Rule 11.3(a)(ii)-(iii), 32 U.S.T. at 1258-60, reprinted
in RECORDS at 75, 77.
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pest Treaty forces the inventor to forfeit the right to control physically
the disposition of the invention. 6 The self-replicating character of microorganisms exacerbates this inequitable result 97 because possession of a
single microbe provides an individual with the capability of producing an
unlimited supply of the organism.9 8 As a result, by requiring a biotech
inventor to supplement the written description with a sample of the
micro-organisms claimed as or employed in the invention, the deposit
requirement forces the inventor to disclose not only the intangible knowhow of the invention, but also the start-up materials necessary to
reproduce the invention.9"
Consequently, inventors of biotechnology face an unwarranted additional burden, that is not imposed upon inventors in any other field of
technology. For example, one commentator compared this burden to a
situation that would require the inventor of the first nuclear power facility to guarantee that sufficient supplies of uranium existed for use in the
facility or to disclose a method for producing uranium.10 0 An inventor
who employs a novel micro-organism in an invention is obligated to supply not only the information necessary to reproduce the invention, but
also the actual invention.' The only readily apparent difference in the
two situations is the difficulty encountered when verbally describing the
micro-organism. This single difference hardly justifies the substantially
different treatment under the same laws.
B.

The Unusual Case of Early Publication

1. History
Another obstacle faced by inventors of biotechnology involves the early
publication of unexamined patent applications, which is unique to certain states."0 2 The practice of early publication, commonly known as laying open, is admittedly an exception to the long-practiced principle that
an inventor cannot be required to disclose an invention until patent
rights have attached.
For nearly 250 years, the tradition in most states with well-developed
or developing patent laws had been to balance the applicant's interest in
96. See generally Position Paper,supra note 3, at 229, 231.
97. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 95-96.
98. See generally Fuller, supra note 52, at 539 (discussing problem of "pocket factories" because of the biological nature of micro-organisms).
99. Position Paper,supra note 3, at 229, 231.
100. See Schlicher, supra note 85, at 275-76.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 106-11, 115, 118 and accompanying text.
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acquiring sufficient protection of rights in the invention against society's
interest in advancing the state of the art.10 3 To insure full protection of
the applicant's interests, the specification, which discloses the nature of
the invention, is not publicly available until patent protection has attached-in other words, the public does not have access to the specifica10 4
tion until the application has been examined and a patent has issued.
This fundamental principle provides the foundation upon which the pat10 5
ent laws in the majority of developed states had been based.
During the 1960s, several European states began to abandon this
principle in favor of an alternative system in which unexamined patent
applications are published eighteen months after the filing or priority
date.' 06 This shift was not precipitated by patent principles, but by external pressures exerted on the European national patent examining offices by the vast number of applications filed during this period.10 7 The
number of inventors seeking to patent their inventions grew at an alarming rate. This growth overburdened the patent offices and caused delays
in the examination process of up to several years.' 08 In turn, the delays
caused uncertainty for other inventors who desired to commence work on
new inventions, but the possibility that their efforts would be wasted if
their inventions later would be found to infringe on a then-pending application deterred them. Similarly, corporations hesitated to invest large
amounts of money in research and development, fearing the inability to
recoup their investment if a similar patent issued in the interim.' 0 9
These conditions were not conducive to industrial growth in the affected
states.
The Netherlands was the first state to attempt to mitigate the apprehension felt by both individual and industrial inventors by proposing the
Netherlands Patent Bill of 1961.11 The objective of the proposal was to
shorten this period of uncertainty, caused by the backlog in the examina-

103. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 30.
104. Id.
105. See generally id. at 26-29.
106. Id. at 30.
107. At the end of 1965, 250,000 patent applications were pending in the German
patent offices. Id.
108. In 1965, granting procedures were taking over five years and, because of the
existing backlog at the time, were most certainly to take longer in the future. Id.
109. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 30. See also infra note 119.
110. Patents Act for the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles of
7th November 1910 § 220 (as amended Jan. 12, 1977 and Dec. 13, 1978), reprinted in
2G JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, at Netherlands -12

(1988).
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tion process, by allowing the patent office to publish unexamined patent
applications within a certain time after their filing date. In 1962, Scandinavia followed the Netherlands lead."' In 1964, Sweden suggested that
the solution of early publication should apply to the European patent
system as well," 2 and the European Community (EC) Working Group
on Patents took up the debate."' The EC Working Group sought to
balance the interests of the public and competitors against the interests of
the patent applicant." 4
In October 1964, the EC Working Group decided in favor of the solution permitting competitors to know of the patent application eighteen
months after filing. The essence of this solution later became Article 93
of the EPC. 1 5 With one exception," 6 all nongovernmental, international
organizations accepted this procedure for early publication.'"
Given the similarity of the EC proposals to those already envisioned
by the Federal Republic of Germany for relieving its own patent office,
the German system naturally changed in accordance with the new proposal."' The losses that might be suffered by applicants as a result of
111. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 30.
112. Id. at 31.
113. Id.
114. In the minutes of the meeting of April 15, 1964, a statement summarized the
objectives sought to be achieved through early publication:
If this question is examined in the light of the interests of the public and the
competitors, it must be desirable for these to know 18 months after filing of the
application what application they must expect (emphasis added). The interests of
the public on the one hand, and the interests of the applicant on the other: it is
from this point of view that the Swedish proposal must be considered, rather than
from the point of view of a longer or shorter duration of the preliminary
procedure.
Id. at 31 (citing the 12th session, Feb. 26-Mar. 6, 1964, Doe. (EEC) 2.632/IV/64, pp.
44, 46).
115. Id. at 32.
116. The International Inventor's Association refused to accept early publication. Id.
117. Although the United States had considered a similar solution, United States
industry concluded that the disadvantages of early publication outweighed the advantages. Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Remedies of the Patent Applicant and His Competitors
in Comparison-Balance or Imbalance? A Comparative Law Study, 20 Ir'L REV. INDUST. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 407, 418 n.34 (1989).
118. See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 32. The official reasons for adopting a system of early publication included:
The [Government of the Federal Republic of Germany] is of the opinion that this
laying-open, which per se is not directly related to the introduction of the deferred
examination, is indispensable in the interests of informing the public as early as
possible about the applications pending at the Patent Office, because it is only in
this way that mistakes in economic planning can be avoided.
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early publication were considered justifiable because
[i]f production has to be stopped after a lengthy period of time because
some proprietary right suddenly appears, with priority extending far back
into the past, considerable economic losses-are incurred. Industry has acjustified in objecting to this
cepted this disadvantage. . . . It is, however,
119
period of uncertainty's lasting too long.
Recognizing that the adoption of early publication marked a break with
traditional patent principles, the German government offered the possibility of returning to the traditional system once the burden on the German patent office had returned to a manageable level.12 °
2.

Problems Created by Early Publication

In the wake of the EPC's harmonizing effect, publication of unexamined patent applications eighteen months after the filing or priority date
became the standard in most European states. 2 Although these revolutionary changes may have aided European industry, they placed the patent applicant in a vulnerable position. Most patents generally will not
have issued within eighteen months. Consequently, the inventor's rights
in the invention go unprotected for the entire period between publication
and the patent grant. 22 In the worst case scenario in which the application is rejected altogether and no patent issues, the applicant has lost not
only the opportunity to patent the invention, but also the opportunity to
protect the invention as a trade secret because the secrecy of the invention already has been destroyed by the laying open of the application. 2
Arguably this loss of trade secret protection is reasonable when the
application is rejected for substantive reasons, such as improper subject

[Tihe arrangement proposed constitutes the sole possibility of tackling the current
difficulties concerning the work load of the German Patent Office and the Federal
Patent Court, without at the same time giving up the German examination procedure, which has proven its worth over the decades.
Id. at 33 (citing 1967 Blatt fiir Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenweser 247-48).
119. Id. at 33 n.82 (citing 1967 Blatt ffir Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenwesen 252).
120. Id. at 33.
121. Early publication especially became commonplace after Article 93 of the EPC

was enacted in 1973. Id. at 30.
122. At the time early publication was first adopted, the Working Group envisaged
that a provisional patent would be issued to protect the applicant's interests during the
interim period between publication and the grant or rejection of the application. Because

the issuance of the provisional patent was to take less than 18 months, the Working
Group assumed that the applicant's invention would not go unprotected. See id. at 31-32.
123. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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matter. In the case of substantive rejection, the applicant should not be
allowed to obtain potentially perpetual protection for an unpatentable
invention through the indirect means of trade secret laws.124 Many ap1 25
Complications, however, are rejected for purely procedural reasons.

pletely denying protection to an invention that may have been an advance in the state of the art is undoubtedly inequitable. 126 Moreover, this
result ignores the long-standing principle of patent law that an inventor
must not be made to surrender the technical teaching of an invention to
the public domain until the granting of exclusive rights therein. 2 7 The
system of early publication forces the applicant to relinquish rights prior
to patent issuance in exchange "for the mere prospect of patent protection.'

2

'

The only way to avoid publication, and thereby preserve the

possibility of trade secret protection, is to withdraw the application at
least ten weeks prior to its being laid open. 2 " Generally, however, not
even a novelty report would be available from the examining office
within this time. Thus, the applicant is in no better position to assess the
patentability of the invention immediately prior to early publication than
at the time of filing the application.'
3. Attempts to Deal with the Special Problems of Biotechnological Inventions
Additional problems result for the inventor of biotechnology when
early publication is combined with the deposit requirement. Important
questions arise regarding the release of samples to third parties. For example, when is the sample to be made available to third parties, and
under what conditions? Rule 28 of the Implementing Regulations of the
European Patent Conventions (Rule 28) originally intended to ensure
that samples would be released to third parties without restriction from

124. "The decision of Congress to adopt a patent system was based on the idea that
there will be much more innovation if discoveries are disclosed and patented than there
will be when everyone works in secret." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
496 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 37.
126. Id.
127. See id. at,36.
128. Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
129. Under the European patent system, the possibility of preventing the applicant's
publication exists up until ten weeks before the eighteenth month after the application is
filed. Id. at 36 n.92.
130. Until 1981, search reports giving the applicant at least an indication of the
patentability of the invention were available by the eighteenth month in 85% of European patent applications. From 1981 to 1987, the percentage dropped to 48%. Id.
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the time of publication.' 31 The Munich Diplomatic Conference 3 2 sup-

plemented Rule 28 to make release of the micro-organism after publication dependent upon certain conditions.133 Amendments were added to
Rule 28 in 1979,134 when the so-called expert solution was adopted. The
expert solution provides that access to the deposited sample be restricted
to an expert appointed by an interested third party who requires a sample between the time of early publication and the time of patent issuance
or rejection. 13 5
Rule 28, as it currently reads, provides the applicant with the option
to invoke the expert solution simply by informing the European Patent
Office (EPO). This solution, however, only applies up until the time a
patent issues or the application is rejected. 3 6 If a patent issues, the pat131. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 70. The draft text for Rule 28 has'
been published in the Preparatory Documents for the Munich Diplomatic Conference
(Vorbereitende Dokumente flr die MiInchner Diplomatische Konferenz) issued by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn 1972, at 222-23. STRAUS &
MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 70 n.194.
132. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 71-72.
133. These conditions stipulated that the person receiving a sample:

[Miust undertake ... not to make the culture issued available to third parties
before the patent application has been refused or withdrawn or is deemed to be
withdrawn, or before the expiry of the European patent in all the designated Contracting States; furthermore, the samples issued and also cultures derived from
those samples may only be used for experimental purposes until such time as the
patent application is refused or withdrawn or is deemed to have been withdrawn,
or up to the date of the publication of the mention of the grant of the Euorpean
patent.
STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 71-72.
134. These amendments incorporated some of the proposals made by MICROPAT
in 1977. MICROPAT was an informal group set up by industry to study the problems
of patenting procedures for microbiological materials. See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra
note 20, at 72-74.
135. See id. at 75-76. The amendments prompted considerable discussion as to which
type of expert solution should be adopted: whether it should apply if no patent issued
after publication, and if so, for how long the restriction should apply. See id. at 76-77.
136. The Administrative Council of the European Patent Office which proposed the
amendment to Rule 28 commented:
Since the expert solution is restricted to the period between publication of the
European patent application and the patent grant [or rejection or withdrawal], it
cannot be judged according to whether it does perfect justice to all the aims of the
patent system in general. Since, according to the proposed version of Rule 28, the
deposited micro-organisms become directly available after the conclusion of the
granting procedure, we can in particular disregard the question of whether an
expert solution with no time limitation would not be an intolerable obstacle to
further research even if taking into account the property rights of the applicant.
STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 80 (citation omitted).
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ent will resume protection when protection via the expert solution ceases.
If no patent issues, the sample becomes available to all requesters the
13 7
moment at which the application is withdrawn or rejected.
C.

Timing of Release

Although the prevailing view endorses deposit as a necessary evil for
completion of microbiological patent applications,13 debate still rages
among states over the release of culture samples. The controversy concerns when, and under what conditions, the sample culture must be
made available to third parties."x 9 Several underlying concerns complicate the issue of release. Because the practice of laying open necessarily
involves the publication of the patent specification, those states laying
open applications have assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that the sample
must be made publicly available in order for the publication to be complete.' 40 These states justify this requirement on the grounds that a deposit is necessary because disclosure of the invention cannot be adequately set out by using only words. Hence, the sample constitutes a
necessary part of the specification that must be published, or released, at
the time the application is laid open." 4
Treatment of the biotech inventor differs greatly from that of inventors in other fields, with the former at a great disadvantage with regard
to tangible property rights in the deposited sample. Clearly, all inventors
seeking patents in states whose laws provide for early publication are
subject to having their applications laid open before a patent issues.
Moreover, because of the peculiar nature of biQtechnological inventions,
early publication gives third parties not only access to a written description of the invention, but also possession of the invention itself. Because
patent protection usually will not have attached at the time of publication, the inventor potentially lacks recourse for several months, or even

years, against potential misuse of the deposited sample.14 1

137. For various critiques of Rule 28's expert solution, see STRAUS & MOUFANG,
supra note 20, at 81-86.
138. See supra notes 21-22; see also Position Paper, supra note 3, at 231-33.
139. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
140. The International Chamber of Commerce is of the opinion that "the point at
which the full sufficiency of disclosure is of primary significance is not the date of early
publication of the unexamined application, but rather the date at which the examined
application is published." Position Paper,supra note 3, at 231.
141. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 46, Rule 28, reprinted in
VAN EMPEL at 386-87; Patent Act 1977, supra note 20, § 16, reprinted in 33 HALSBURY'S STATUTES, at 145-46. But see STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 104-05.
142. See Position Paper,supra note 3, at 233-34.
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Indeed, the biotech inventor might be prevented permanently from
seeking relief against misuse if a patent does not issue ultimately. If no
patent issues, the micro-organism will be left to circulate in the public
domain and perhaps provide another inventor with the starting material
for a similar invention.1,4 3 In the most unfortunate case involving patent
rejection based on procedural defects in the application, the sample may
be used to reproduce the very material or process that the original appli144
cant was attempting to patent.
Releasing the sample culture only upon the third-party requester's
fulfillment of certain conditions may provide some relief to the inventor.
The lack of agreement among states as to a uniform set of conditions,
however, has prevented any satisfactory solution. Even in states in which
release is not permitted until the patent issues, the question still exists as
to what should be the conditions of release. 45
VI.

THE VIABILITY OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS

Faced with the problems inherent in the patenting of biotechnological
inventions and micro-organisms, inventors may attempt to protect theirdiscoveries by alternative means. One alternative to patent protection is
the trade secret law. In the United States, an inventor reserves the right
to hold in secret any invention and to claim it as a trade secret.1 46 Trade
secret rights have been recognized in the United States for more than a
century.'47 As early as 1883, a circuit court observed that "no constitutional or statutory provision . . . was, or ever has been, necessary to the
right of any person to make an invention ...or to use it when made, or
to sell it to someone else."' 48 The Supreme Court affirmed the principle

143.

Id. at 232-233.

144.

Id.

145. See generally id.; SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 147-58.

146. Restatement of Torts provides the most widely relied upon definition of trade
secret:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF TORTS § 757 ant. b (1939).
147. See, e.g., In re Brosnahan, Jr., 18 F. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1883).
148. Id. at 64. The court stated further:
Such a right has always existed, and would exist now if all patent laws were
repealed. It is a right which may be called a natural right, and which, so far as it
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that patent law and trade secret law do not necessarily conflict with one
another.149 The Court reasoned that "[tlrade secret law and patent law
have co-existed in the country for over one hundred years. Each has its
particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from
150
the need for the other.3
A.

The Positive Aspects

Trade secret protection remains an especially attractive option for inventors whose inventions are, for some reason, not patentable. Often
these nonpatentable inventions are a source of economic value or competitive advantage that demands some mode of protection against misappropriation by competitors.1 5 ' Trade secret protection is also available to
protect inventions whose infringement would be difficult to detect or to
prevent.152 Biotechnological inventors are discovering that the patent
laws of many states do not provide sufficient protection against subsequent misuse. Consequently, these inventors are turning to trade secret
law for protection. 5 '
Even inventors of clearly patentable inventions may have reason to
resort to trade secret law.' 54 First, trade secret protection continues for as

long as the invention remains secret. Patent protection, however, has a
limited duration.' 55 Second, the costs of trade secret protection are limited to the expenses incurred in keeping the invention secret. The cost of
obtaining and enforcing a valid patent generally will be greater. 156 Additionally, competitors have no notice of the trade secret, whereas complete
disclosure is a prerequisite to obtaining a patent.' 57 Finally, with most
microbiological inventions, as long as the micro-organism necessary to
practice the invention remains unavailable to competitors, trade secret

may be regulated by law, belongs to ordinary municipal legislation; and it is unaffected by anything in the constitution or patent laws of the United States.

Id.
149. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974).
150. Id. at 493.
151. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
152. See SALIWANCKHIK, supra note 14, at 10.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
155. SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 12. Realistically, the term of trade secret protection may be less than the 17 years granted by a United States patent, because biotechnology is a "fast-moving area of science." Id.
156. A primary cost component of patenting biotechnology is the expense incurred
when depositing a micro-organism. See Schneider, supra note 2, at 602 nn. 93-95.
157. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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protection also will exist for the invention. 158 Under patent law, if the
inventor files in a state whose laws require a culture deposit, the deposited sample may be released. This release of the sample gives competitors
access to what was initially the inventor's secret.' 59
B.

The Negative Aspects

Nevertheless, trade secret protection of biotechnological advances is not
without drawbacks. The primary hurdle of this alternative form of protection is that whatever is being claimed as a trade secret must remain
secret. Once secrecy is lost, the possibility of trade secret protection is
destroyed.' 60 Furthermore, trade secret law lacks the scope of protection
available under the patent paradigm. Unlike a patent that prohibits
others from making, using, or selling the invention during the life of the
62
patent, 6 ' the law of trade secret recognizes both reverse engineering1
and independent development 6 as permissible forms of competition.
Additionally, publication of a trade secret in an enabling form' destroys secrecy.' 6 5 In contrast, although publication prior to the patent
158. For example, disclosure of a microbiological process without making available

the key microbe necessary to practice the invention preserves trade secret protection of
the process. SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 12.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13.
161. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
162. See Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889). The presiding judge stated:
If a valuable medicine, not protected by patent, is put upon the market, any one
may, if he can by chemical analysis and a series of experiments, or by any other
use of the medicine itself, aided by his own resources only, discover the ingredients
and their proportions. If he thus finds out the secret of the proprietor, he may use
it to any extent that he desires without danger of interference by the courts.
Id. at 13. This discovery by analysis of the marketed product constitutes reverse
engineering.
163. Most industrial nations of the world have maintained a right of prior user,
which permits a trade secret user to practice the invention as a secret without the possibility that a subsequent patentee will be able to assert patent rights against this prior
user. A prior trade secret user that is unknown to the patentee will not render the subsequent patent invalid. This approach arguably weakens the protection afforded through
the patent grant. SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 17 n.8.
164. In the United States, the enabling disclosure is statutorily mandated by 35
U.S.C. § 112. To constitute an enabling disclosure, the description of the invention must
be sufficient to enable someone skilled in the particular art of the invention to make or
use the invention. See, e.g., W.L. Gore v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
165. SALIWANCHIK, supra note 14, at 13. See, e.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
442 F.2d 216, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1971).
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grant bars the inventor from ever receiving a patent on that particular
invention, the inventor holding a patent can publish information about
1 6
the invention without fear that a competitor will use the information.

Furthermore, a competitor might be able to obtain surreptitiously the
trade secret through theft or breach of a confidential relationship with
the inventor.1 6 1 If the invention had been patented, the misappropriating
competitor would be liable as an infringer upon subsequent use of the
invention.'6

Clearly, a biotech inventor faces, early in the developmental process,
difficult decisions concerning the protection of property rights in the invention. 6 9 Encouraging inventors to choose the patent route promotes
disclosure, benefits the public, and advances biotechnology. If a state's
patent law places too many obstacles in the inventor's way, the likelihood
of protection by a less efficient means, such as trade secret law, greatly
increases.1 70
VII.

ARTICLE 15-THE PROPOSED

EC DIRECTIVE

In 1985, after publishing a white paper on the "Completion of the
Single Market," the Commission of the European Community (the
Commission) initiated unification attempts, which included unification of
the various patent systems.1 ' A primary goal with regard to patent protection for biotechnological inventions was to enable European industry
to look to the EC "as a uniform environment for its economic activi-

ties. '1' To create a uniform, single market in the EC, the differences
among the states in the treatment of biotechnological inventions must be
eliminated or at least minimized. More importantly, new differences
17 3

must not develop.

After assessing the situation, the Commission had no doubt that the
differences among states needed to be removed by directive. The Commission proceeded under the arrangement that already had been estab166. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
167. See, e.g., Forest Lab., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis.),
affid in part and rev'd in part, Forest Lab., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th
Cir. 1971).
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
169. See Roman Saliwanchik, Microbiological Inventions: Protect by Patenting or
Maintain as a Trade Secret, 19 DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL MICROBIOLOGY 273-

277 (1978).

170. See, e.g., Position Paper, supra note 3, at 231.
171.

See STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 86.

172.
173.

Id.
Id.
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lished within the EPC framework. Fortunately for the inventor of biotechnology, the Commission implicitly acknowledged that Rule 28 does
not strike a fair balance between the interests of the inventor and the
interests of the general public and competitors. 74 The Commission's
proposal, embodied in article 15 of the Directive, 1 75 proposes four substantial changes to be made in the Implementing Regulations of the
EPC, yet retains, in principle, the expert solution contained in Rule
28.176

The first proposed modification would extend the deposit requirement
to all inventions employing self-replicating material, regardless of
whether they involve micro-organisms. 77 This proposal would have farreaching implications with respect to animal and plant matter, but it
does not affect directly the treatment of biotechnological inventions or
inventors.
The three remaining proposals are of greater importance to biotech
inventors. All three proposed modifications are concerned directly with
the release of or access to the deposited material. 17 ' Article 15(5)(a) of
the proposed EC Directive provides that when the patent application is
refused, withdrawn, or deemed to be withdrawn such that no patent protection attaches, the deposited material will not be released either to
third parties or to neutral experts.1 79 This modification is a tremendously welcome improvement over Rule 28. Rule 28 provides that regardless of whether the applicant has chosen the expert solution, in the
event that the application fails, the deposited sample, or a culture derived
thereform, must be made available to any requesting party.8

174. Id. at 86-87.
175. Proposed EC Directive 1989: Working Paper of the EC Council Working
Party on Intellectual Property (Patent/Biotechnology), ch. 4, art. 15 [hereinafter Proposed EC Directive], reprinted in STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 165-67.
176. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 87. The 1988 original official wording
of the Directive was modified in 1989. See id. at 165 & n.463.
177. Id. at 87.
178. See Proposed EC Directive, supra note 175, art. 15(5)(a), 15(7)(a)(i)-(ii), reprinted in STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 166.
179. Article 15(5)(a) reads:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7, unless the patent application is
refused, withdrawn or deemed to be withdrawn, a sample of the deposited material shall be available upon request to any person from the date of publication of
the patent application and to any person having the right to inspect the files under
the provisions of national patent law prior to the date of publication.
Proposed EC Directive, supra note 175, art. 15(5)(a), reprinted in STRAUS &
MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 166.
180. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 87.
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To lend credibility to the additional restrictions on the accessibility
and availability of the deposited material, the Commission emphasized
that the original purpose behind early publication in Europe was to apprise interested parties of pending patent rights, rather than to give those
parties an opportunity to exploit those inventions commercially.1 81 The
Commission also recognized that early publication carries immense disadvantages for biotechnological inventors when access to the deposited
material remains unrestricted after publication and upon rejection of the
application."8 2 The Commission acknowledged that the loss of the inventor's ability to use the invention as a trade secret was a devastating consequence of unrestricted access to the deposited material. 8 Although article 15(5)(a) represents an improvement in existing practice, it fails to
solve all problems posed by early publication. 84
The remaining modifications found in the proposed EC Directive, located in article 15(7)(a), also relate to the nonexistence of patent protection when the patent application fails. Both provisions of article 15(7)(a)
impose tighter restrictions on persons requesting and receiving samples
of the deposited material than those imposed by Rule 28. Article
15(7)(a)(i) requires that the requester must not grant access of the deposited material to third parties. 8 5 This obligation remains in force after
refusal or withdrawal of the application, or after the expiry of the pat-

181. Id. at 87-88.
182. Id. Commenting on this problem, the Commission opined:
While the possibility of losing the confidential nature of an invention exists for all
published but subsequently unsuccessful patent applications, the release of material which greatly facilitates the use of an invention distorts the disclosure rule to
the unwarranted advantage of a competitor, because of the greater immediate
value of a sample of the deposited material than that of a written description.
In respect of deposited animate matter, therefore, it is necessary to separate the
desired notice function of the early publication from the undesirable effects of providing the capability for the public to employ the invention for other than verification or experimental purposes.
STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 88 (citation omitted).

183.

See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.

184.

STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 87-89.

185. Article 15(7)(a)(i) states:
7. (a) Any person requesting a sample of the deposit under paragraph 5 or 6
hereof must undertake:
(i) not to make it or any matter derived therefrom available to third parties
irrespective of whether the application has been refused, withdrawn or
deemed to be withdrawn.
Proposed EC Directive, supra note 175, art. 15(7)(a)(i), reprinted in STRAUS &
MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 166.
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ent.'8 Article 15(7)(a)(ii) provides that anyone to whom a sample is
issued must undertake to use the sample culture, or cultures derived
therefrom, for experimental purposes only. 18 7 This obligation is not limited as to time or place and only ceases to apply when the patent issues.""' The obligation also will expire when the patent application is
refused or withdrawn, in accordance with Rule 28.19
When taken together, the two provisions of article 15, paragraph 7
achieve a result equivalent to a direct prohibition on exportation of the
sample to states in which a patent has not yet issued. 9 Because the
requester must promise to use the material for experimental purposes
only and must agree not to transfer the sample or derivatives of the sample to third parties, the mere use of the sample by the requester in a
patent-free state poses no greater threat to the inventor's property rights
than use within the grantor state.' The obligations placed on the requester apply regardless of time or location. 192
The Commission supports this nonexportation restriction, or its
equivalent, that implies a contractual relationship between a patentee
and the patent grantor, whereby the patentee receives certain exclusive
rights as consideration for disclosure.19 3 Under this theory, consideration
is illusory "if disclosure takes place in the form of a sample of selfreplicating material for the public of that legal territory for which no
patent has been granted or applied for."'194 The transfer of the sample to
a patent-free state 9 5 is not imposed by patent law, nor is it in the inter186. Id. See also STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 88.
187. Article 15(7)(a)(ii) states:
(a) Any person requesting a sample of the deposit under paragraph 5 or 6 hereof
must undertake:
(ii) to use the deposited matter or any matter derived therefrom in any
country only for experimental purposes concerning the invention.
Proposed EC Directive, supra note 175, art. 15(7)(a)(ii), reprinted in STRAUS &
MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 166.
188. See Article 15(7)(b), which reads:
The undertakings provided in paragraph 7 (a) hereof shall also apply after the
grant of the patent unless the patentee has voluntarily abandoned his rights or the
patent has expired.

Id.
189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 89.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. A patent-free state is one that either has not granted a patent on the particular
invention or does not consider microbiological inventions to be patentable subject matter.
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ests of the grantor state. Therefore, the transfer serves no genuine patent
purpose and should be kept to a minimum.' 9 6 The proposed Directive,
through the provisions of article 15, indicates that the Commission at
least implicitly recognized the component of tangible property inherent
1
in biological material, even if they did not express explicitly that view. 7
VIII.

ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING SYSTEMS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

A.

European States and the European Patent Convention

By incorporating the expert solution into Rule 28 and by proposing
additional restrictions on release, the EPC has made laudable attempts to
alleviate the hardship suffered by biotech inventors. Unfortunately, these
remedies fail to strike at the root of the problem-the accepted practice
of early publication. Although implemented out of the necessity to in-

crease the efficiency of and relieve the burden on European national patent offices, early publication creates complications that neither the expert
solution nor the proposed Directive takes into account.' 9 8
Article 15 of the proposed EC Directive provides that after rejection
or withdrawal of an application, the sample deposited in connection with
the application will not be subject to release to anyone under any circumstances. 9 Article 15, however, fails to acknowledge that third parties will have had access to the sample since publication. Because patent
protection has not attached to the micro-organism, the only protection
accorded under article 15(7)(a) is the restriction placed on the requester's use of the sample. 0 0 Nevertheless, the opportunity to misuse
the sample still exists because of the self-replicating nature of microorganisms. Even if misuse is unlikely, the likelihood is greater than if the
deposit had not been released prior to the issuing of a valid patent.2 0
Furthermore, under article 15, the applicant does not have the opportunity to prevent the release of deposited biological material in the event a
patent is granted, if during the course of examination the deposit was

196.
197.
198.

STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 89.
Id.
See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.

199. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
200.

Proposed EC Directive, supra note 175, art. 15(7)(a), reprinted in STRAUS &

MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 166.

201.

In the United States, which does not permit release before the patent grant,

misuse of a sample prior to patent grant would be impossible, provided the depositor did
not distribute samples. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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deemed unnecessary and superfluous.20 2
Few reasonable solutions exist for curing this dilemma. Even the acceptable solutions carry undesirable collateral effects. The most ameliorative solution would be to end completely the procedure of early publication. Although the remedial effects on the rights of biotech inventors
would be tremendous, the cessation of early publication would re-impose
an enormous burden on the European national patent offices. 2 03 Unless
the backlog in the patent offices could be rerouted, this solution would
result in additional problems and delay for inventors, as well as for interested third parties.

20 4

Legislative measures taking into account the special dual nature of
biological materials could be enacted, as was attempted with article 15.
For example, the release of a deposited sample upon the application's
publication is not justified by the arguments set forth in support of early
publication. 20 5 Publishing only the application, without releasing samples of the deposited culture, would serve the purpose of apprising interested parties of potential patent rights and would protect fully the inventor's property rights in the deposited material.20 6
Concessions must be made to allow the applicant to reclaim possession
of the deposited sample upon realization that deposit is unnecessary to
fulfill the disclosure requirement. Penalizing the applicant for underestimating the ability of the written word to sufficiently describe his-invention serves no valid purpose.20 7
B.

The United States

The situation in the United States, with respect to release conditions,
is more favorable than that of any other a state.20 8 Flaws, however, still
exist that render protection for microbiological inventors less effective
than ultimately could be possible with proper modifications. The United
States has rejected early publication and remained true to the traditional
view that an inventor does not surrender property rights in the invention

202. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 92. Cf In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
203. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206.

The claims contained in the application describe the nature and boundaries of

the invention, rather than information for actually practicing the invention. See generally
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 451-53.
207. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
208. See Position Paper, supra note 3, at 231-32.
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until those rights are replaced with patent rights. 20 9 As a result, the deposited sample is not released until the examination procedure has been
completed.21
Waiting to release the sample is advantageous to the inventor for several important reasons. First, the inventor's intangible, as well as tangible, property rights are protected fully until the time the patent takes
effect. Because the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is the only
party granted access to the deposited micro-organism during the examination process,21 1 the applicant does not risk misuse of the deposited
sample by competitors. Both the application and the deposited sample
remain confidential during the period prior to the issuance of the patent.212 Hence, any protection the inventor might obtain under trade secret laws remains intact. Similarly, if for some reason the application is
rejected, the sample is not made available to third parties. Therefore, the
applicant retains the right to make the final determination as to the invention's disposition. 213 Again, the applicant may choose to seek protection under trade secret laws.
In contrast, after the inventor has obtained the patent rights and the
sample is released, the inventor cannot further restrict release of the
sample.2 14 Simply stated, once a patent issues, the inventor has very limited power to make release dependent upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. At first glance, this result is no different than the situation
involving the patenting nonbiotechnological inventions. Indeed, this result arises from the quid pro quo in which the inventor gives up the
right to secrecy in exchange for the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
the invention for a limited period. Nevertheless, as previously discussed,
release of a deposited micro-organism affects not only intellectual property rights, but also tangible property rights.21 5 To successfully protect
the latter, the inventor must be able to exercise at least a modicum of
control over the disposition of the deposited sample. This extra control
dictated by the dual nature of biotechnological inventions is accomplished
most effectively by allowing the inventor to specify certain conditions
upon which release of the deposited sample is predicated.21
209. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 44-49.
210. Id.
211. 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(a) (1990).
212. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
213. STRAUS & MOUFANG, supra note 20, at 48.
214. 37 C.F.R. § 1.808(a)(2) (1990).
215. See Position Paper, supra note 3, at 232.
216. See Berge Hampar, Patenting of Recombinant DNA Technology: The Deposit
Requirement, 67 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 569 (1985).

824

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL, 24:793

By refusing to grant this right of minimum control to inventors, the
United States patent law produces an anomalous result. A patent applicant's tangible property rights in the deposited material are protected by
contract at all times prior to the patent grant or rejection. After the invention passes the rigorous test of patentability, this contractual protection disappears.217 Consequently, the term of the patent protection afforded to biotechnological inventors effectively is reduced from the
statutory term of years to the period of time during which the application is pending. 218 If an underlying purpose of patent law is to draw
innovation into the public domain, this scenario of a reduced protection
term is completely unacceptable. By underprotecting the inventors' rights
affected by the patent process, the system encourages inventors to seek
protection under the trade secret laws.21 9
The International Chamber of Commerce has set forth several conditions that it considers to be reasonable and necessary, in light of the
concerns raised. 22 0 These conditions include permitting the released sample to be used for experimental purposes only, 22 1 prohibiting transfer to
third parties,2 22 prohibiting exportation of the released sample,223
prohibiting release of the sample to states where no enforceable rights
exist, 224 and imposing restrictions on material derived from the deposited
material.225
Permitting the patentee to exercise some control over the release of the
sample is compelling for several of the same reasons justifying the existence of the deposit requirement. 226 For instance, the difficulty of sufficiently describing the micro-organism in writing is analogous to the difficulty of proving the infringing similarity of a competitor's microorganism to the micro-organism claimed in the patent. Furthermore, if
the invention claimed is a manufacturing procedure that merely employs

217.
218,

Id. at 603.
Id.

219. See supra notes 146, 151-59 and accompanying text.
220. See Position Paper, supra note 3, at 232-33, 240.
221. Id. at 232. This limitation gives the patent owner additional protection in situations in which patent rights would be difficult to enforce.
222. Id. This prohibition recognizes the importance of the patentee's ability to keep
track of the identity of parties who possess a sample of the deposited material.
223. Id. at 232-33. This prohibition prevents use of the sample in a patent-free state
and subsequent re-importation of the final product to the original state.
224. Id. at 233.
225. Id. at 233. This restriction prevents possible mutation of the organism to the
point that it falls outside the scope of the patent.
226. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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the deposited micro-organism as an essential element, absent a mandate
against exportation of the sample, the manufacture could be carried out
in a state in which the invention has not been patented. The final product then could be imported back to the state of origin. When the requester is not restricted from exporting the sample or from taking it to
patent-free states, infringement of this type will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the patentee to prove. 2
IX.

CONCLUSION

An immediate solution to the problems involved in patenting biotechnological inventions in Europe is not readily apparent.228 The European states and the EPC should abandon the practice of early publication and return to the traditional system of prohibiting publication prior
but it should
to patent grant. This solution cannot be effected over night,
229
be adopted as a long term goal for the European states.
Returning to the traditional system alone, however, is not enough. All
states must begin to allow inventors to place restrictions on the release of
deposited samples to protect their interests sufficiently. Examples of possible restrictions have been set forth herein.2 30 The need for greater harmonization in this area cannot be overstated. The failure of any major

state to offer sufficient protection of biotech inventors' interests renders
the protection afforded by all remaining states irrelevant. The law of the
weaker state will prevail and will discourage potential patent applicants
in all states. Inventors instead will turn to trade secret laws, which, in
21
the long run, will not be in any party's best interest.
Brandi L. Wickline

227. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 232-33.
228. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
231. Position Paper,supra note 3, at 231.

